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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Brief of Farmers Insurance does not correctly analyze the issues raised by the 
policy terms; relies upon case law that is clearly distinguishable; and mischaracterizes the 
controlling case of Carlino v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company 546 N.E. 2d 909 (NY 
1989). This is a matter of first impression. The Appellate Court's of this State have not as yet 
ruled on the question of stacking automobile liability insurance policies. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE THREE VEHICLES IN QUESTION WERE OWNED BY BARBARA 
PELLUM AND NOT BY HER HUSBAND PAUL PELLUM. THE "EXCESS" CLAUSE OF EACH 
POLICY PROVIDES FOR "STACKED" COVERAGE. 
In its Brief, Farmers states that the three vehicles were owned by Barbara Pellum and 
her husband Paul Pellum. When the Summary Judgment proceedings were commenced by 
plaintiffs in the Court below, the Memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment contained a factual statement based upon 
information obtained from the motor vehicle division of the tax commission. Paragraph 5 of 
that factual statement states: 
"At the time of the accident in question, Barbara Pellum, the mother, owned 
three vehicles: a 1981 Camaro automobile; a 1978 El Camino automobile; 
and a 1978 El Dorado automobile. All three vehicles were insured by 
defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange under separate but identical automobile 
insurance policies. A specimen of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
Barbara Pellum paid a full premium for each policy.M 
A 
Farmers in its Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and in support of its own Motion states: 
"For purposes of these motions for summary judgment, defendant does 
not dispute the "factual statement" set forth in plaintiffs Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities. The defendant, however, disputes any facts which 
purport to set forth the extent of the damages sustained by the plaintiffs in this 
accident, since that issue is the subject of a separate lawsuit Civil No. 
91751288." 
Why Farmers has chosen an inconsistent position relative to the ownership of the 
vehicles in question is unknown. It has, however, refocused plaintiffs' analysis of this case 
and raises a further point. To begin, we again quote the "Other Insurance" provision of the 
liability section of the policy: 
"Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable Auto Liability insurance on any other policy that 
applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay only our share. Our share is 
the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. 
We will provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or a family 
member, up to the limits of Financial Responsibility Law only. 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any 
other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any 
other member company of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total 
amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided by 
the single policy with the highest limits of liability." 
We ask the Court to note the "excess" clause of that section which reads: 
"Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible insurance." 
The policy defines "you" and "your" to mean the named insured (Barbara Pellum) and spouse, 
if a resident of the same household (Paul Pellum). Neither Paul Pellum, the step-father, nor 
Barbara J. Pellum, the daughter, have any ownership interest in the three vehicles, although 
they are by definition insureds under each policy. The liability of Paul Pellum stems from the 
fact that he signed for the driver's license of the minor, Barbara J. Pellum. He is an insured 
under separate policies covering three vehicles he does not own. The policies are collectible in 
each instance and hence the "excess" clause of each policy applies and are available if the limit 
of one policy does not satisfy the damages in this case. 
Again we note the liability portion of the policy which provides: 
"PART I - LIABILITY 
Coverage A - Bodily Injury 
Coverage B - Property Damage 
We will pay damages for which any insured person is legally liable because of 
bodily injury to any person and property damage arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a private passenger car, utility car or utility trailer." 
The liability coverage is not restricted to any listed vehicle. In each policy Farmers promises 
to pay the full amount of liability coverage for which an insured person is liable because of 
personal injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any passenger car. This 
type of liability coverage follows the insured person and not the insured vehicle.1 
The later Second Edition of Farmers policy restricts coverage to the "insured car" and would bar this lawsuit. 
To this point, we conclude that each policy covers the legal liability of the three 
defendants. However, we must read other provisions of the liability section to determine 
whether that conclusion is in any way restricted. 
The "Other Insurance" provision of the liability section of the policy is applicable. 
First, it contains a "pro rata" clause which provides that if there is other applicable 
liability insurance, the policy will participate pro rata up to the total liability limits. Without 
question all three policies apply in this case and must contribute up to the policy limits if the 
amount of damages so indicate. 
Second, the policy contains an "excess" clause where Farmers provides insurance for a 
vehicle not owned. Neither Paul nor the daughter own either of the vehicles, but each is 
insured under each policy for this loss. Since we do not know which policy applies to this 
loss, all three policies are both primary and excess. 
Third, the policy contains a clause limiting coverage to the single policy with the 
highest limits of liability. This third clause, (anti-stacking) has the effect of eliminating two of 
the policies (which ones are unknown) without regard to either the "pro rata" clause or the 
"excess" clause. Farmers seeks to have the Court focus entirely upon the anti-stacking clause 
and states that controls the outcome of this case. Farmers1 analysis is flawed and 
impermissible. 
Nielsen v O'Reiley, 848 P2d 664 (Utah) holds: 
"The terms of insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted 
in accordance with their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a 
whole in an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract 
provisions." 
Fanners has made no attempt to harmonize the several clauses of the "Other Insurance" section 
of its own policy. 
How is it possible for this Court to give effect to the "pro rata", "excess" and "anti-
stacking" clauses of the policy at the same time. Insurance cannot be given in one breath and 
taken away in another without creating an irreconcilable ambiguity. That is the case here. 
Under settled Utah law, in a situation such as this where an insurance contract has inconsistent 
provisions, one of which can be construed against coverage, and one which can be construed 
in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 
POINT n. EXCLUSION NO. 10 IN THE LIABILITY SECTION OF THE POLICY HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE. 
Rather than deal with the ambiguity present in the "Other Insurance" provision of the 
policy, Farmers directs the Court's attention to Exclusion No. 10 in the policy which it says 
prohibits the application of three policies in this case. The exclusion reads: 
"This coverage does not apply to . . . 
10. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of ownership, maintenance or 
use of any vehicle other than your insured car, which is owned by or furnished 
or available for regular use by you or a family member. . . . " 
This particular feature of automobile liability insurance is contained in this or a similar form in 
all auto liability policies. It is designed to prevent an insured from purchasing one policy 
covering one owned vehicle and then claiming coverage on other owned vehicles through the 
"use other car" or "omnibus" provision of the policy. This is understandable. A person 
should not be able to buy insurance for one vehicle and then expect that policy to cover an 
accident caused by another owned vehicle. That is not the case here, however. Plaintiffs are 
not seeking to apply coverage on one vehicle to an uninsured vehicle involved in an accident. 
On the contrary, each of the vehicles in this case owned by Barbara Pellum carry a separate 
and identical policy. 
Referring to the specific language of the exclusion, the Court will note that the 
exclusion is limited to a vehicle: 
"which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or a family 
member" 
The evidence in this case is that neither of the vehicles was owned by either Paul 
Pellum or daughter Barbara, and there is no evidence whatever that either of the three vehicles 
were furnished for the regular use by Paul or Barbara. 
A fair reading of the exclusion will demonstrate that it has no application to this case. 
POINT III. PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE "LIMITS OF LIABILITY" SECTION OF THE POLICY 
HAS NO APPLICATION. 
Paragraph 4 of the "Limits of Liability" in the liability section of the policy reads as 
follows: 
"We will pay no more than the maximum limit provided by this policy, 
regardless of the number of vehicles, insured, insured persons, claims, 
claimants, policies, or vehicles involved in the occurrence". 
Farmers claims that this section lend credence to its position that the policies cannot be 
stacked. The paragraph has no such purpose. When properly construed, the paragraph is 
saying that regardless of the number of claimants or insureds, or vehicles, etc., Farmers will 
pay no more than the maximum limits of the policy, and those limits cannot be expanded in 
any event. Each policy contains the same paragraph. The answer to Farmers assertion is 
simple. Plaintiffs are not seeking to expand the limits of coverage of any of the three policies. 
They are only asking Farmers to provide the coverage promised under each policy. This 
provision of the policy would only have application, as an example, where four people in the 
same accident were each seeking the policy limits of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
coverage for a total of Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00) from a single policy when the 
policy promised only Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) total liability coverage for multiple 
injuries. 
POINT IV. THE CASES CITED BY FARMERS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE. 
Farmers cites Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Company, 762 P2d 1119 (Utah App. 
1988). This case involves Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance. This case involved a 
pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle. Her medical expense exceeded Four Thousand Dollars 
($4,000.00). She received Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) under the insurance policy of 
the vehicle that struck her and claims an additional Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) under 
her own automobile insurance policy. The policy contained the following provision: 
"OTHER INSURANCE^] No insured may receive duplicate benefits under this 
and any similar insurance. Similar insurance may apply to an accident 
involving bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injury to someone else 
involving the use of your auto. If it does, all benefits payable cannot exceed the 
highest available under any one policy. We will pay our proportional share of 
such benefits. That share will be our proportion of the total benefits available." 
i n 
The Court held that the Utah statute on personal injury protection did not either provide 
for or prohibit the stacking of coverage. Under the circumstances, the Court applied the above 
"Other Insurance" clause and ruled that stacking was not possible. 
The distinction between our case and Crowther is apparent. First, there is no "excess" 
clause in Crowther. Second, the "pro rata" clause in our case is the total of all applicable 
limits. In Crowther proration is limited to the insurance company's share of the highest single 
benefit. 
Goetz v. American Reliable Insurance Co. 844 P2d 366 (Ut App. 1992) cited by 
Farmers is of similar import. It involves PIP coverage. 
Here again, the American Reliable policy did not contain an "excess" clause except in 
its "Medical Payment" feature of the policy which was not part of the contract. In our case 
there is an unique "excess" clause. The case is also distinguishable because Paul Pellum is an 
insured under all three policies and Goetz was not insured under one of the policies involved in 
that case. 
The clear distinction is that in our case there is a contractual "excess" provision in each 
policy. 
Additionally liability insurance is made subject to 31(a)-21-307 U.C.A. (Chapter 21 of 
the Insurance Code) whereas "uninsured", "underinsured" and "PIP" policies are not 
specifically made subject. 
Nielson v. O'Reiley 848 P2d 664 (Utah 1992)2 is an uninsured motorist coverage case. 
The single policy in this case insured two vehicles. Contrast this with our case where three 
vehicles are insured under separate but identical policies. The policy did contain a clause 
restricting coverage to the single highest limit of any one such policy. However, the 
This case is cited in Appellants Brief for the dissent of Justice Stewart. 
distinction between that case and ours is that there is no suggestion of an "excess11 clause or a 
"pro rata" clause in O'Reiley and that case dealt with one policy only, not three separate 
policies as in our case. 
Martin v. Christensen 454 P2d 294 (Utah 1969) relied upon by Farmers is also an 
uninsured motorist case involving two policies. It states in substance that if there were other 
policies issued by the company that apply, a total payment to the insured would not exceed the 
highest limit of any one policy. This case is distinguishable because of the fact that it is 
uninsured motorist coverage. It does not contain a "pro rata" or "excess" clause and the 
"Other Insurance" provision in our insurance code did not exist in 1969, the year the case was 
decided. 
Farmers relies on cases from other jurisdictions. 
Agnew v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company 441 NW 2d 222 (Wis. 1989). 
Interestingly this case involves a Wisconsin statute which is almost identical with 31(A)-21-307 
U.C.A. The claim of plaintiff was that the Wisconsin statute would not allow provisions that 
prohibit stacking of policies. The Court did not reach that point, however, ruling that the 
statute did not apply because the policies in question did not "promise to indemnify against the 
same loss". The reason the Court reached that conclusion is because the separate policies in 
that case covered a specific vehicle and covered liability incurred only by reason of the 
operation of that separate vehicle. The distinction is that our case involves a "pro rata" clause 
an "excess" clause and promises coverage for the operation of "any passenger car". 
Miller v. Detroit Automobile Interlnsurance Exchange 341 NW 2d 155 (Mich. App. 
1983). This case has no precedential value in our case. The policies covered only "owned" 
and "non-owned" automobile and an "owned" automobile was defined as the vehicle described 
in the declaration certificate. The policies in our case provide coverage for the operation of 
any passenger car. 
Englund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 475 NW 2d 369 (Mich. 
App. 1991). 
This case was decided with reference only to an exclusion similar to exclusion 10 in the 
Farmers policy. Plaintiffs have already shown that Exclusion 10 has no application to this 
case. The vehicles in this case were not owned by Paul Pellum or by the daughter, and there 
is no evidence that any of the vehicles were furnished for the regular use of either. 
The Englund case does not discuss the terms of the liability provision, nor does it 
discuss the terms of any "Other Insurance" provision in the policy. As stated by our Supreme 
Court: 
"Insurance contracts. . . should be read as a whole in an attempt to harmonize 
and give effect to all of the contract provisions". 
Williams v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 445 S 2d 211 (La. 
App. 3 Cr. 1984) 
In this case the liability provision provided coverage for injuries sustained by accident 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use of the "automobile". The distinction is clear. 
The Farmers policy coverage is not restricted to the "owned" vehicle or the vehicle described 
in the declarations. 
Wood v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 766 P2d 269 (Nev. 1988). Nevada 
has a statute allowing a company to restrict coverage to a single limit. The statute has an 
interesting caveat: 
"Any limiting provision is void if the named insured has purchased separate 
coverage on the same risk and has paid a premium calculated for full 
reimbursement under that coverage." 
The coverage in each of the policies in this case apply to the operation of "any 
passenger car" and is conceded by Fanners that Mrs. Pellum paid a separate and full premium 
for each policy. 
Bishop v. Washington 488 2d 1088 (Pa Supp. 1984). This case lacks precedential value 
because its "Other Insurance" provision speaks only of the highest limit under multiple 
applicable policies. Evidently there was not a "pro rata" clause or an "excess" clause as in the 
Farmers policy. 
American Standard Insurance v. Ekeroth 791 P2d 1220 (Colo. App. 1990). This case 
held that liability insurance could not be stacked on account of the provision restricting the 
amount of coverage to the highest limit where two or more cars are insured. We are not 
enlightened as to any other provisions of the policy and whether the coverage was "portable" 
as in our case. 
Rando v. California State Auto Association 684 P2d 501 (Nev. 1984). In this case a 
minor was operating a borrowed vehicle and caused the accident. The vehicle driven by the 
minor was one of four insured under a single policy. State Auto Association also insured 
under a single policy three vehicles owned by the minor1 s mother. The policy on the vehicle 
paid one limit and State Auto Association paid one limit under its policy. The question was 
whether coverage on each of the mother's policies could be stacked. The Court pointed out 
that stacking had been allowed in Nevada under both uninsured motorist coverage and basic 
reparation benefits. The Court distinguishes those types of insurance from liability insurance 
on the basis that the former are first person insurance whereas liability insurance focuses on a 
particular vehicle and applies to third party claims. It prohibited stacking on public policy 
grounds and the fact that there was only a single policy involved. Additionally, the Court 
discussed the concept that liability policies usually relate to a particular vehicle, rather than the 
insurer and the insured. This seems to be one of the reasons that stacking was disallowed. 
The actual terms of the policy are not given, however. The distinction is that in our case the 
insured is promised coverage for losses arising out of the use of "any passenger car". 
Until the terms of the policy in the Nevada case are disclosed it has no precedential 
value. 
POINT V. FARMERS MIS-APPLIES THE LEADING CASE OF CARUNO V. LUMBERMENS 
MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY. 546 NE 2d 909 (New York 19891 
Farmers takes issue with the leading case of Carlino v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty 
Company 546 NE 2d 909 (New York 1989). New York insurance regulations mandate "pro 
rata" clauses in automobile liability policies. Farmers contends that 31(A)-21-307 U.C.A. 
permits the provisions ("Two or More Autos" clause) barred by New York statutory scheme. 
Farmers1 view of the Carlino case is erroneous. The "Other Insurance" clause and the "Two 
or More Autos" clause are identical in both the Farmers policy and the Lumbermens policy. 
The New York court held that the "Two or More Autos" clause had the effect of canceling out 
the "pro rata" clause which was mandated by insurance regulation and therefore not 
permissible. Farmers, makes the argument that our "Other Insurance" statute allows just the 
opposite, namely, that the statute allows the "single highest limit" provision. Plaintiffs dispute 
that contention and believe that the only fair reading of that statute is that where there are two 
or more policies having application, the aggregate protection of those policies cannot be 
reduced. 
More importantly, this Court must consider the "excess" clause in the Farmers policy 
viewed in the light of Section (2) of the statute which reads: 
"(2) Subject to Subsection (1), the policies may by their terms define 
the extent to which each insurance is primary and each is excess, but if the 
"other insurance" terms of the policies are inconsistent, there is joint and several 
liability to the insured on any coverage which overlaps and which has 
inconsistent terms. Subsequent settlement among the insurers does not alter any 
rights of the insured. The commissioner may adopt rules consistent with this 
section concerning "other insurance"." 
When there is "overlapping" or "excess" insurance, there is joint and several coverage. 
That is our case and it is mandated by the statute. 
Farmers then states: 
"Most importantly, the Carlino case deals with stacking of liability 
coverage for a non-owned automobile, a more portable type of coverage when 
compared to the coverage for an insured while driving one of its owned 
vehicles. Liability coverage for non-owned vehicles owned by an insured is not 
linked to a particular vehicle and therefore differs from the issue pending before 
this Court." 
We note once again, that the liability feature of the Farmers policy is not linked to a particular 
vehicle. 
This Court can decide this case in favor of "stacking" without reaching the divergent 
interpretations of Section (1) of 31(A)-21-201. The fact is that the "Other Insurance" clause in 
the Lumbermens policy is identical with that in the Farmers policy. Both contain "pro rata", 
"excess" and "Two or More Autos" clauses. Regardless of why those clauses are included, 
statutory or otherwise, they are still in the policy and must be given effect. In our case as in 
Carlino, the insurance company is attempting to reduce the coverage from what would 
otherwise be provided by the "pro rata" clause. This is a fatal ambiguity and the "Two or 
More Autos" clause must give way. Even further, each policy purports to be "excess" over 
other collectible insurance. This is overlapping coverage and as a result the statute makes the 
policies jointly and severally liable. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have directed this Brief to matters raised in Farmers' Brief which require 
further analysis and explanation not contained in the original Brief of plaintiffs. The 
conclusions arrived at are these: 
1. The three policies provided coverage to an insured person for bodily injury arising 
out of the use of a private passenger car. This coverage is not restricted to any particular 
vehicle such as the vehicle listed in the declarations. 
2. "You" is the named insured and spouse if a resident of the same household. 
"Insured" also includes a family member. (Daughter in this rase). The "Other Insurance" 
portion of the liability part contains both a "pro rata" clause and "excess" clause and a highest 
single limit clause. All three clauses cannot be given effect and the ambiguity must be 
resolved in favor of coverage. 
3. Paragraph 4 of the "Limits of Liability" section of the policy are not applicable 
because the plaintiffs are not asking that the coverage of any one policy be expanded. They do 
seek and are entitled to the coverage promised by each of the three policies. 
4. Exclusion No. 10 does not apply because all three vehicles are covered by a 
separate policy of insurance and neither of the vehicles is owned by Paul Pellum nor the 
daughter and there is no evidence that such vehicles were available for regular use by Paul or 
the daughter. 
5. The New York case of Carlino is on all fours with our case and is directly in point. 
It provides conclusive precedent. 
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